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Abstract 
Tonga is a small developing island in the south pacific and ICT is still in its early stages. In this paper we ask the 
questions, what is social engineering and who is this social engineer, what are the threats to Tonga, how can these 
threats be identified and which countermeasures can be taken to mitigate the risk of social engineering? The 
answers to these questions will lead to a social engineering risk management framework to make the risks of social 
engineering more transparent and help organisations implement mitigating controls against social engineering. 
The study was performed in four chosen organisations in Tonga, who were involved with Information 
Communications, Finance, and Cyber Security in order to model threats and countermeasures and develop a risk 
management framework.  
  
Keywords: Risk management; Social engineering; Information security; Cyber security; Organisational 
Vulnerability; Security threats; Threat assessments.     
INTRODUCTION 
The technical aspects of information security have been in the spotlight for several years (Solomon and Chapple, 
2005, p.56), and has made much progress. In general, large improvements in security can no longer be attained 
by upgrades in hardware or software. It is therefore difficult for attackers to achieve their goal through technical 
attacks alone and their focus shifts (even more) to the organisations employees (Richards, 2008, p.41). As a result, 
organisations need to direct increased attention toward the undertreated human factor of information security to 
guard and stay in control of their critical information. For many organisations, the weakest link in information 
security is now human (Mahfuth et al., 2017, p.1). Organisations need to raise the security on this human factor 
to an even par with the technical security Legg et al., 2015, p.1). In response, information risk management the 
top training priority for Information Technology security professionals (Luiijf, 2012, p.57). Organisations are 
looking to develop flexible frameworks that give insight to the risks involved and help them adapt to changing 
environmental factors. 
Although there have been studies conducted on the human factor of Information Technology, it is still a relatively 
unexplored field of scientific research. In most cases, the literature does not have a scientific foundation and does 
not give a clear overview but merely discuss case descriptions (Tsohou et al., 2010, p.227). However, all of the 
previous mentioned studies show that the human factor can cause great damage to organisations, not only financial 
but, also to the organisation’s image, which in turn influences the organisations goals and continuity in the long 
run (Drevin et al., 2006, p.448). 
Ironically, employees are not only important assets, but also pose a great threat. Employees not only know where 
to look but have the advantage of obtained trust and accessibility to systems (Nurse et al., 2014, p.271). Attackers 
can misuse the employees or could even be one of them. There have been known cases of technical hack, and the 
most notorious human hacker, Chris Hadnagy, asserts that breaches start with a phishing email or vishing call, 
then they go to a technical hack (Shin, 2017, p.1). This study will primarily focus on the threats from external 
parties, however, also internal threats and culminate in a high level social engineering risk management model. 
This can be used to gain transparency on the subject, implement mitigating controls, and help organisations 
manage their social engineering risks. 
This study focuses on 'social engineering', the manipulated compromise. Mitigating the threats of this 
manipulation will also reduce the intentional and unintentional compromising of systems and information 
therefore, lower overall risk. While this research hopes to provide incentives that may help to ensure business 
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continuity and give organisations in Tonga a clear view on social engineering, it also aims at finding out how to 
strengthen the weak link in information security, the human factor, by looking at: 
“How social engineering occurs in organisations?” 
The measures that can be used to stop social engineering from causing harm. How an organisation can measure 
the risks and their protection from social engineering threats and if necessary apply appropriate countermeasures 
to mitigate these risks and stay in control of their information, thus ensuring business continuity. 
LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
Social engineering has been defined as the unauthorised acquisition of sensitive information or inappropriate 
access privileges by a potential threat source, based upon the building of an inappropriate trust relationship with 
a legitimate user (Dudek, 2006, p.1). That is, pretending to be someone you are not, with the goal of misleading 
someone into giving out information they should not give. Social engineering is an aspect that involves both 
intellect and technical experience, but more importantly it is an evolving phenomenon that needs to be monitored 
constantly. If attackers are willing to be consistent in finding loopholes in the system, then security experts should 
balance and overcome that attempt. With that thought in mind, the basis of this literature analysis is to find out 
what is trending in not only the cyber world, but also to assess the status of organisations in Tonga with regards 
to social engineering security.   
As a result, it is evident in the literature that a number of researchers have invested time and resources into 
exploring social engineering. In addition, they look for the latest techniques. However, despite the vastness of the 
exploration, this analysis will focus on a certain number of key elements that relates to the area of interest. 
Hackers and Social Engineers 
Hacking and social engineering are closely related. Social engineering tactics are applied to gather information in 
preparation of a hack and the motives and goals of both types of attacker are related (Ziccardi, 2013, p.75), as 
social engineers are also known as ‘people hackers’. It is therefore important to know who these (people) hackers 
are (Warren, & Leitch, 2010, p.427). In this section, a description of hacking and the hacker will be given along 
with the motives a social engineer may have. 
Hackers, Crackers and Phreakers  
There are hackers with good intentions. For instance, searching for vulnerabilities in the information system so 
they can be controlled. There are also hackers with bad intentions, using the identified vulnerabilities for personal 
gain. There are three types that all get the predicate ‘hacker’ in the media; hackers, crackers and phreakers 
(Milberry, 2012, p.112). The jargon dictionary defines a hacker as: “A person who enjoys exploring the details of 
programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who prefer to learn only 
the minimum necessary” and “one who enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming or 
circumventing limitations” (Watson, 2012, p.260). A hacker is therefore someone who seeks challenges and 
overcomes boundaries using his or her skills. Hackers follow an ethical code and do not act illegally, which 
differentiates them from the crackers (Long & Wiles, 2008, p.104) 
A cracker is someone who breaks into the system with the goal of theft or vandalism and therefore does not act 
ethically (Rahalkar, 2016, p.90). Crackers form small groups within the hacking community and are seen as ‘a 
lower form of life’ by other hackers (Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 2003, p.178). Another name for these crackers 
is ‘dark-side hackers’ (Svensson, 2016, p.90). Finally, phreakers use information and social engineering skills to 
break into telephone systems and use these for various purposes such as, making long distance phone calls at 
another’s expense, stealing phone card numbers or pretending to call from a secure location. People hackers - in 
contrast to technical hackers - focus on the weaknesses in the human, instead of the technology they use. The 
people hackers referred to in this study all have malicious intent and could therefore be classified as ‘people 
crackers’ according to previous classification (Barghuthi & Said, 2014, p.2). For the purposes of this paper, the 
term hacker will imply to those hackers, or crackers working with malicious intent (Richards, 2008, p.40). 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING ATTACKS 
Knowing why social engineers might attack is crucial for estimating the likelihood of a social engineering assault 
on a specific organisation, and to implement appropriate measures and controls to counter this assault (Lafrance, 
2004, p.12). The motivation of different subcultures within the hacking community will now be discussed 
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followed by the motives of the social engineers. Bodhani (2013) identifies four subcultures within the hacker 
community, each with different motivation; casual hackers, political hackers, organised crime, and internal agents 
(p.65). There are also hackers that do not act as a member of a subculture. The Australian government performed 
research on the personal motives of a hacker (Madarie, 2017, p.80) such as monetary gain, intellectual challenge, 
power, and so on.  The motives of the social engineer can be classified according to a variation on the results of 
this research (Krone, 2005, p.2). For each category, a general description of the motive is given, a classification 
in malicious or good intentions, and what role social engineering can play in an attack with this motive.  
The way social engineering can be used in an attack is subject to the goal of the attack. If the goal is to acquire 
specific information, social engineering can play a great part in the attack. But the main challenges taken up by 
attackers are still technical; in most cases therefore social engineering will be used to gather information and 
prepare for the final attack. To stop the social engineer from succeeding, organisations need to apply measures to 
counter the social engineering attacks and tactics. They can change the environment of the asset, they can choose 
to act on occurring attacks or they can mitigate the social engineering risk by the structured implementation of 
countermeasures (Smith et al., 2013, p.250). This study focuses on transparency of social engineering and 
therefore on the structured implementation of countermeasures.  Also, the information security controls, which 
encapsulate several measures to mitigate the social engineering risk will be classified and listed. After which the 
key elements pertaining to the human factor are discussed in more detail.  
Information Security Controls  
In order to secure organisation’s data, certain controls must be in place. There are several proposed classifications 
found in the literature however, Harnesk & Lindström (2012) defines the three most cited dimensions - 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) (p.80). Kind of measure; physical, logical or organisational. 
Moment of action; corrective, repressive, preventive and detective. Most other models do not classify the reason 
of protection because, social engineering threatens the confidentiality, integrity and availability and the applied 
controls need to protect against all of these (Luiijf, 2012, p.56). The classification is based in part on a 
classification by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and complemented with input from 
the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL), they both classify the controls on two dimensions. The classification proposed 
here also consists of two axes, the first according to the function of control, the second according to the level in 
the organisation (Dempsey et al., 2011, p.5). 
Function of Control 
The function of a control is related to its place and effect in the security management process. (Tse, 2004, p.1507). 
The ITIL classification for security management is used to complement and add an extra level to the process 
(McPhee, 2008, p.5), defined by the NIST as this only discusses a limited number of functions. Security controls 
are safeguards or countermeasures employed in order to avoid, detect, or minimise security threats or risks to 
information, computer systems, or other assets (Tayouri, 2015, p.1098). These controls can be classified based on 
several criteria. For instance, the time they act, in relation to a security incident: Before the event, preventive 
controls are employed to prevent security incident from occurring such as, locking out unauthorized intruders; if 
a security incident occurs; during the event, detective controls are intended to identify and characterize an incident 
in progress such as, by sending out an alert; after the event, corrective controls are in place to limit the extent of 
any damage caused by the incident e.g. by recovering the organisation to normal working status as efficiently as 
possible (Whitman, 2004, p.52). To support the specific controls against social engineering some general security 
controls need to be implemented. These form a base for the more specific controls and will probably -in part- be 
implemented already to protect other assets from other forms of attack. 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
A guidance of a methodology is highly recommended to maintain the integrity of the findings. Information 
security experts are aware of social-engineering threat but to date have never seemed to focus their efforts on 
studying and understanding in depth how and why cyber criminals are using social-engineering method as a 
weapon (Alexander, 2016, p.2). Yildiz (2007) argued that, some research suffers from definitional vagueness of 
its concept (p.647). A researcher has to decide the type of research to be conducted in order to answer the pivotal 
research question that will disclose new knowledge. Exploratory research, on the other hand, is employed in this 
type of study as it allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of an issue or problem (Straub, et al., 2004, 
p.63).     
Due to the fact that this topic has not been explored in depth and never in Tonga, Exploratory Research approach 
is employed to guide this study. An exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out ‘what is happening; to 
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seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light (Saunders et al., 2012, p.139). 
Exploratory research design does not aim to provide the final and conclusive answers to the research questions,  
but merely explores the research topic with varying levels of depth but to help to give a better understanding of 
the problem (Singh, 2007, p.38). Unstructured interviews are the most popular primary data collection method 
with exploratory research (Sreejesh, et al., 2014, p.47). The interviews were held using a leading questionnaire of 
open questions. The questionnaire consists of the following stages as represented in figure 2: 
1
Interview 
introduction
Introduce the 
study
Confidentiality 
information
2
Interviewee 
introduction
Introduce to the 
organisation
Relevance to 
Information 
Security
3
Verification 
definition
Social 
Engineering 
definition 
Verify 
interviewee 
knowledge
4
Model walk 
through
Social 
engineering risk 
management
5
Closing
Verify Its 
usefulness
Recommendation
Acknowledge 
interviewee 
participation
 
Figure 2: The questionnaire steps 
The questionnaire structures the interview but still makes it possible to go deep enough to answer the research 
questions with a clear foundation. 
Case Selection 
The interviewed organisations were chosen based on the reliance of their business on information and IT and the 
level of risk of a social engineering attack. The interviews have therefore been held with an international IT service 
organisation  due to its business focus on information processing and storage for external parties; a consulting 
organisation whose greatest assets are its personnel and knowledge; a regional governmental organisation due to 
its increased risk to a social engineering attack; and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the Tongan 
government (CERT) as the focus of this organisation is on the cyber security within the government by 
coordinating IT security incidents, informing and advising on these incidents and supporting the governmental 
Formulate the 
problem
Design the study
Collect the data
Analyse the data
Research output
Processes
Input
Output
 
Figure 1: The design of the study 
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organisations in the prevention of, and response to security incidents. All these organisations have a different 
perspective on information, its value, the risks they run and possible counter measures. Within the visited 
organisations the interviews where held with security officers and/or other security responsible personnel. 
Together these interviews represent a valuable perspective on social engineering as these organisations and 
specific interviewees should be the ones at the forefront of information protection from for example social 
engineering. Next to these interviews, the opportunity presented itself to discuss this matter during a cyber security 
seminar held at Tonga National Centre followed by discussion between the security representatives of several 
governmental organisations, as well as organisations from the private sector. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings from the interviews have been de-identified and have only in part been related to the organisations 
or market. The confidential use of interview findings was a precondition for cooperation of the organisations as 
the provided information could be used in identifying participating organisations and vulnerabilities within these, 
which is not the intention of this research. Therefore, diagrams and organisational descriptions cannot be made 
any more detailed. The following findings are related to the organisations activities and are structured according 
to the stages of the questionnaire followed by relevant comments not directly related to the questionnaire. 
Organisation
Support Services
Finance Personnel Equipment Education
Organisational 
Infomation
 
Figure 3: Organisation’s activities 
The organisation is divided in two parts, one executive in which the main activities are performed, the other 
supporting in which administrative activities are performed. The interview clearly focused on the organisational 
information division. The interview was held with the Chief Company bureau services, responsible for the 
organisational information. 
Social engineering risk assessment model  
The interviewee was not familiar with the term ‘social engineering’ but did recognise the description and 
examples. During the interview, the stated definition was used as reference. 
Organisational Description 
As the interview focused on the ‘organisational information’, the organisational description follows. The 
workplace and workstations are not related to the functions except for data mining. Access is not restricted to the 
local environment; however private use is restricted. Internet access is only available when necessary for the role 
or function an employee performs. The functions can be divided in three groups; primary, supporting and 
management. Authorisations are granted on a need to know basis and related to functional profiles. More 
authorizations may be provided on request. Segregation of duties is implemented within and between the 
functions.  
Threat Identification 
The organisation handles highly sensitive information, which is of great interest to criminal organisations as well 
as curious social engineers and hackers. But in general, all information in the organisation is of interest and can 
be of use to the social engineer. A short list of threats where identified, detailed threats more specific to the 
organisation have not been listed: 
o Internal reports do not follow a workflow and can be anywhere on the work floor. 
o Not all information is classified and can therefore be handled improperly. 
o Access is logged. However, it happens that people log on to another’s profile or use another’s password. 
o Some external parties need access to the system before they can be screened. However, these persons 
should be under supervision constantly. 
o It is possible to intercept classified communications. 
o People working at home create a threat. 
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Vulnerability Identification 
Some vulnerability can be derived from the threats: 
o It is not known where information is during processing; there is no accountability. 
o Classification procedures are not followed. 
o The password security policy is not followed. 
o The authorisation process is not suitable for some activities. 
o Some means of communication are not secure; however, they are necessary for operations. 
o Procedures for media usage are not followed. 
o People do not follow the information security procedures outside the office. 
Prior to the interview, this organisation was faced with bad media coverage due to leakage of information after 
careless handling. The organisation thereafter performed a specific assessment on the information crossing the 
organisational boundary, this lead to the implementation of specific controls to counter this vulnerability. 
Control Analysis 
Some examples of controls are - Policy is implemented to stop information from crossing the organisational 
boundary. USB ports are generally disabled, Information that does need to leave the organisation on a memory 
stick or over the internet is secured through encryption, There is an awareness project that relates to the awareness 
of the information you use and training in how to use this so it stays secure, Leakage through personal contacts is 
traced and measures are taken if necessary, There are heavy penalties on deliberate leakage, Physical access is 
restricted through specific measures and the last one is, Penetration tests are performed, focusing on technical 
hacking through for example WIFI connections and Smartphones. But also, social engineering is tested through 
physical penetration testing and desk sniffing. The findings from this are used to confront people during the 
awareness trainings. 
Organizational 
description
Organisation
clear description 
Threat 
identification
Social 
engineering 
attack model
Vulnerability 
identification
Vulnerability 
assessments 
Internal threats 
Control 
analysis
Information 
security
Physical 
security 
Technical 
securityPolicies & 
Procedures
Likelihood 
determination
Risk assesment
Impact 
analysis
Determine risk
Recommendations
Organisation 
Information
System Detail 
Information
Documentation
 
Figure 4: Social engineering risk assessment model 
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Likelihood Determination 
There is a fair likelihood a social engineer can gather information from this organisation. However, more critical 
information will be less likely to leak due to the need to know basis on which it is spread through the organisation. 
In contrast, some threats on less critical information are simply accepted. So, the likelihood depends on the 
information and cannot be determined in general. 
Impact Analysis 
There are two general consequences of a successful social engineering attack; 
o The image of the organisation can be harmed. 
o The organisational processes and even people can be harmed. 
Determine Risk 
Even though awareness training and penetration tests are implemented there is still some social engineering risk. 
The organisational process sometimes prevails over the risk of leaking information. However, the risk is still 
present due to careless personnel. 
Recommendations 
Organisations need to follow a security management process consisting of a policy statement, followed by 
awareness, in turn followed by audits. In discussion with the interviewee, the following controls where identified 
which were already implemented in part - Authorisation management should be implemented, Physical access 
should be restricted through for example access gates, Data should always be classified, Physical pieces of 
information should be kept behind locked doors or in a vault, Server rooms should also be locked and hard disks 
with confidential information should be locked up and finally, Audits should be performed on the adherence to 
policy and procedures. 
A general conclusion was that people see the world around them in which information is stolen, however they do 
not see the need to be careful with information they handle. Awareness training is required to remove this 
misconception. 
DISCUSSION  
To solve the research problem three main research questions where stated, the deliverables related to these 
questions will now be discussed to see if the research questions have been answered: 
Which risks do organisations run as to social engineering? 
To be able to identify social engineering risks the definition of social engineering is given in the introduction. 
Based on the knowledge gained on the findings and discussions, a risk assessment can be made. This risk 
assessment should be performed structurally this is also a component of the social engineering risk management 
model as in the discussion. When an organisation follows the steps in this model and more specifically the risk 
assessment this will help them to get a view on their specific social engineering risk. It however cannot give a 
general risk level, because of the great diversity in organisations.  
The actual social engineering risk management model structures the risk management process and generates 
assurance for the management on their level of control over social engineering consisting of 10 steps - System 
and environment characterization, Objective setting, Threat & Vulnerability identification, Likelihood 
determination, Impact analysis, Risk Evaluation, determination & Response, Control analysis & Implementation, 
Supporting policy and procedures implementation, Information and communication management, Ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation. These steps can be related to the management process components of the Enterprise 
Risk Management Integrated Framework (ERM) of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
commission (COSO) and therefore be implemented as part of this overall management process. The components 
are: internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, control activities, 
information and communication and monitoring. 
Therefore, this model is relatively elaborate and should be tailored to the organisation and/or incorporated in the 
organisations ERM process. Based on this social engineering risk management model and the observations from 
the research conclusions have been drawn and stated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The paper discusses the social engineering risk management using a model in line with Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). The discussion started with the definition of social engineering risk management and its 
relevance and benefits to organisations; the limitation of social engineering risk in accordance with the 
organisations objectives. Also, the goal of implementing a social engineering risk management model based on 
existing risk management models is stated; to assist the organisation in managing the social engineering risk. 
In conclusion, the social engineering risk management model could solve the research problem: The model is 
however still defined on a high-level and application in practice should show the actual usefulness. On this some 
recommendations for further research are stated. 
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